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Information contentThe information gap in the M&A market hinders acquirers from eﬀectively
identifying high-quality targets. We examine whether VC/PEs convey informa-
tion content in the M&A market and whether acquirers can use such informa-
tion to identify high-quality targets. We show that VC/PEs have signiﬁcant
information content and can signal high-quality target companies via ‘‘certiﬁ-
cation”. When acquirers lack acquisition experience and targets are located in
inferior information environments, VC/PE ‘‘certiﬁcation” is more signiﬁcant.
The better reputation a VC/PE has, the more information it conveys. Syndi-
cate VC/PEs convey stronger information than independent VC/PEs. We also
ﬁnd that acquirers do not pay higher premiums for high-quality targets. Over-
all, our results suggest that VC/PEs have value relevance in the M&A market,
conﬁrming their ‘‘certiﬁcation” role. We present means for acquirers to select
high-quality targets and investors to build eﬃcient portfolios.
 2016 Sun Yat-sen University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This
is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecom-
mons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
As newly revised regulations that encourage mergers and acquisitions (M&As) (e.g., ‘‘Measures for the
Administration of Material Asset Reorganization of Listed Companies” and ‘‘Administrative Rules on Acqui-
sition of Listed Companies”) are implemented, an increasing number of listed companies are striving to
achieve rapid transformation and enhance core competitiveness through M&As. Thus, identifying high-
quality targets has become a crucial issue for listed companies.
Although some companies possess innovative technologies, heterogeneous resources and new business
models, they also face many challenges in the growth process, including a lack of funds, limited productrnal of
2 Q. Tang, W. Li /China Journal of Accounting Research xxx (2016) xxx–xxxdevelopment capability and restricted market expansion potential. These issues largely restrict the future
growth of the companies (Zhu and Fei, 2010). As a result, when companies are unable to solve bottlenecks,
they tend to seek help from more ‘‘well-oﬀ” companies. For the acquirers, these candidates can generate syn-
ergistic eﬀects through resource complementation or enhancement, bring new proﬁt growth and strengthen the
acquirers’ core competitiveness. Hence, they are considered high-quality targets. Nevertheless, capturing use-
ful information to identify these targets can be a diﬃcult task, as many growing companies, especially start-
ups, exhibit problems such as low information transparency, limited records of past transactions and the
uncertainty of new product development (Elfring and Hulsink, 2003). In particular, due to conﬁdentiality, tar-
get companies are often reluctant to disclose detailed information about core technologies and resources
before conﬁrming M&A transactions. Consequently, the information gap that arises during M&As poses a
great challenge to acquirers when searching for high-quality targets. Research has found that venture capital-
ists (VCs) and private equity ﬁrms (PEs) can decrease the information asymmetry between companies and
investors at the time of initial public oﬀering (IPO) by providing ‘‘certiﬁcation” (Megginson and Weiss,
1991). Can VC/PEs also decrease the information gap and play the role of ‘‘certiﬁcation” during M&A
transactions?
In the recent years, due to the reform of the IPO system by Chinese regulators and the ‘‘Barrier Lake
Eﬀect,” the exit channel for VC/PEs has changed and M&As have gradually become an important exit chan-
nel. According to Wind, there were only seven cases of VC/PE exit through M&As in 2004 and an average of
thirty-one cases per year until 2012. However, in 2013 and 2014, the number of exit cases through M&As
jumped tremendously to 120 and 560, with total amounts of RMB12.835 billion and RMB68.562 billion,
respectively. The diﬀerence in book returns between IPO exit and M&A exit is shrinking. Therefore,
M&As are becoming one of the main ways for VC/PEs to exit and are expected to become the ‘‘new norm”
in the near future. This oﬀers us the opportunity to investigate whether VC/PEs have information content in
the Chinese M&A market. When VC/PEs send positive signals to the market, this indicates that VC/PEs play
a ‘‘certiﬁcation” role in the M&A market. This also decreases the information gap in the M&A process and
provides practical guidance for acquirers to identify high-quality targets.
In this paper, we use Chinese A-share listed companies engaged in M&A transactions during 2013–2014 as
our initial research sample and manually collect information about the transaction sellers backed by VC/PEs.
Our main results are as follows. First, VC/PEs have strong information content in the M&A market and deli-
ver positive signals to the market. Investors react positively to M&A transactions with VC/PE-backed target
ﬁrms, which supports the ﬁnding that VC/PEs play a ‘‘certiﬁcation” role in the M&A market. Second, when
acquirers lack acquisition experience and targets are located in a poor information environment, the ‘‘certiﬁ-
cation” role of VC/PEs is more signiﬁcant. Third, the better the reputation a VC/PE has and the more VC/PEs
a target ﬁrm has, the stronger the information content is and the more favorably the market reacts. Fourth,
after examining whether acquirers pay higher prices when acquiring VC/PE-backed targets, we ﬁnd that
acquirers obtain high-quality targets without having to pay higher premiums.
Our study makes several contributions. First, from the perspective of non-ﬁnancial information, we exam-
ine the eﬀect of the information embedded in VC/PEs on the value of targets during M&As. The literature
related to the eﬀect of target-related information on M&A value focuses mainly on the eﬀect of ﬁnancial infor-
mation quality on M&As (Raman et al., 2013; Pan and Yu, 2014; McNichols and Stubben, 2015) rather than
how non-ﬁnancial information aﬀects M&A value. Masulis and Nahata (2011) ﬁnd that acquiring VC-backed
target ﬁrms yield higher cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), as the agency conﬂict between VCs and other
stockholders can lead to lower target pricing. Diﬀerent from Masulis and Nahata (2011), we emphasize the
VC/PE signaling mechanism in the M&A market. We ﬁnd that VC/PEs have signiﬁcant information content
in the Chinese M&A market and can signal the high quality of target companies. Our ﬁndings also diﬀer from
those of Gompers and Xuan (2012), who ﬁnd that acquiring VC-backed targets presents lower CARs based on
U.S. data.
Second, from the M&A perspective, we provide evidence that VC/PEs perform a ‘‘certiﬁcation” function.
Since Barry et al. (1990) and Sahlman (1990) proposed the VC/PE ‘‘certiﬁcation/supervision model”, a large
number of studies have empirically examined it in the IPO setting and found support for it using European
and American data (Barry et al., 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Brav and Gompers, 1997). Bertoni
et al. (2015) discover that VC/PEs also play a ‘‘certiﬁcation” role in the ﬁnancing activities of many youngPlease cite this article in press as: Tang, Q., Li, W. Identifying M&A targets and the information content of VC/PEs. China Journal of
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as acquirers and non-listed companies as targets and ﬁnd that VC/PEs also perform quality ‘‘certiﬁcation” in
the M&A ﬁeld. That is, we extend the ‘‘certiﬁcation” function of VC/PEs from the IPO setting to the M&A
setting.
The conclusions of this study have important practical implications. First, we conclude that M&As have
become an important means to solve problems during the transformation and upgrading of Chinese compa-
nies. The research has unfortunately done little to identify high-quality targets, which are necessary prerequi-
sites for M&A transactions to achieve a synergistic eﬀect. Therefore, how to identify high-quality targets is a
core research question with both practical guidance and academic value and comprises the research value of
our study. According to our study, acquiring VC/PE-backed targets can bring a higher value to listed com-
panies. This ﬁnding provides useful guidance for listed companies when choosing M&A targets. Second,
we conclude that the ‘‘certiﬁcation/supervision” hypothesis of VC/PEs is often tested using the IPO setting
in China. Most studies have concluded that VC/PEs do not possess a ‘‘certiﬁcation/supervision” function
and have further claimed that VC/PEs cannot screen out or help to develop high-quality ﬁrms (Yang et al.,
2015). We think that this conclusion is inconsistent with the contribution made by VC/PEs in reality, as rely-
ing solely on IPO scenarios does not fully reﬂect the role of VC/PEs. Thus, motivated by VC/PEs exiting
through M&As in reality, we consider the setting in which listed companies acquire non-listed target ﬁrms
and ﬁnd that VC/PEs also play a ‘‘certiﬁcation” role. This ﬁnding allows us to better understand and evaluate
the function of VC/PEs in China.
2. Theoretical analysis and hypotheses
Due to the information asymmetry in the M&A market and the large number of potential targets, acquirers
are often faced with a serious information gap when selecting target ﬁrms. Such an information gap is partic-
ularly problematic when acquiring entrepreneurial ﬁrms due to the certain characteristics that entrepreneurial
ﬁrms usually exhibit. First, these ﬁrms have low corporate information transparency (Hyytinen and Pajarinen,
2008). As a result of their relatively short history, entrepreneurial ﬁrms lack detailed trackable business
records, and their ﬁnancial information is insuﬃcient to reﬂect the ﬁrms’ future value. Second, these ﬁrms
have low proportions of ﬁxed assets, with R&D resources, patent technology and other intangible assets tak-
ing up higher percentages (Qian and Zhang, 2007). This creates great diﬃculties when conducting ﬁrm eval-
uations. Finally, entrepreneurial ﬁrms experience high growth and high risk (Qian and Zhang, 2007). In terms
of technology, they are quite capable of making breakthroughs in the market and developing new products.
From the business model perspective, entrepreneurial ﬁrms may also oﬀer business model innovations that
lead future development trends. However, the risk persists that the market will not recognize these new tech-
nologies, products and business models.
The preceding arguments reveal that in the M&A process ﬁrms encounter an information gap in at least
two aspects: target identiﬁcation and evaluation. First, when screening out targets, acquirers often lack an
in-depth understanding of target ﬁrms’ private information, such as their core technology resources or busi-
ness models. Second, when determining the price of M&As, not enough information is provided to eﬀectively
evaluate the target ﬁrms. As this information is related to target ﬁrms’ value creation in the future and has the
characteristics of private information, it constitutes the content of the information gap for acquirers. In this
case, although the target ﬁrms present their ﬁnancial information, the public information is still not enough
for acquirers to identify and evaluate future targets. This leads us to wonder whether VC/PEs can make up for
the information gap in the M&A market by conveying information about target ﬁrms.
In the IPO market, the ‘‘certiﬁcation/supervision model” states that high-quality ﬁrms are more likely to
attract VC/PEs. When the market lacks an eﬀective way to reﬂect ﬁrms’ true value, VC/PE holdings can be used
as an IPO ﬁrm’s ‘‘certiﬁcation,” which investors perceive as a signal that the ﬁrm has a promising future. This
subsequently decreases the information asymmetry and the issue price of the IPO (Barry et al., 1990; Sahlman,
1990). In the M&A market, a similar information asymmetry exists between acquirers and targets. The infor-
mation gap hinders acquirers from eﬀectively identifying high-quality targets. VC/PEs can perform eﬀective ex
ante screening and provide value-added ex post services, which help to send the signal of high-quality targets to
the market. These target ﬁrms usually have rich technology resources, abundant intellectual property andPlease cite this article in press as: Tang, Q., Li, W. Identifying M&A targets and the information content of VC/PEs. China Journal of
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for the information gap and play the role of quality ‘‘certiﬁcation” in the M&A process.
First, ex ante, VC/PEs can screen out high-quality targets. VC/PEs involve equity capital investment in
emerging, fast-growing and potentially competitive ﬁrms (American Venture Capital Association). They are
invested in by professional fund managers andcharacterized by high risks and large proﬁts. As active investors
with keen insights (Bottazzi et al., 2008), VC/PEs specialize in collecting information about, screening and
evaluating investment projects. They rely on professional judgment and social networks to identify target ﬁrms
with potential investment value in the market.
In general, how do VC/PEs identify target ﬁrms? When VC/PEs make investment decisions, they go
through four phases: project search, project screening, project evaluation and contract signing. They focus
mainly on a ﬁrm’s outlook, the quality of its entrepreneurs and its expected rate of return (Fried and
Hisrich, 1994). MacMillan et al. (1985) study U.S. venture capitalists and ﬁnd that they consider six factors
when making investments, including entrepreneurs’ personality, entrepreneurs’ experience, the overall quality
of the entrepreneurial teams, the innovation of the ﬁrm’s products, the market competition structure and the
ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial situation. The ﬁrst two factors are the most important. In addition, VC/PEs pay great atten-
tion to ﬁrms’ social networks, human capital, patents and other factors (Baum and Silverman, 2004). Using
their professionalism, experience and network resources, VC/PEs try their utmost to identify high-quality tar-
get ﬁrms. Chemmanur et al. (2011) and Guo and Jiang (2013) provide evidence that ex ante VC/PEs can select
outstanding ﬁrms with higher labor productivity, R&D capabilities and sales growth. In fact, in an early
study, Sahlman (1990) points out that VC/PEs are agencies that screen (and supervise) projects. Therefore,
for acquirers, VC/PEs’ selection activities serve as an alternative to acquirers’ selection and screening of
high-quality targets.
Second, VC/PEs enhance the quality of ﬁrms by providing ex post value-added services. After VC/PEs
invest in the ﬁrms, they provide a series of value-added services to further increase the ﬁrms’ value. These ser-
vices have three eﬀects. First, they promote ﬁrms’ innovation. VC/PEs mostly invest in high-growth ﬁrms,
which often possess more advanced R&D technology resources (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Guo and
Jiang, 2013). Consequently, the entry of a VC/PE can encourage them to develop more patents (Kortum
and Lerner, 2000) and new products (Hellmann and Puri, 2002). After M&A, these innovative resources accel-
erate acquirers’ upgrading and transforming processes. Second, the ex post services can improve corporate
governance. Following the investment of a VC/PE, directors are often appointed to the ﬁrms. These directors
take on supervision and management responsibilities, optimize the compensation structure, enhance the cor-
porate governance structure and standardize the ﬁrm’s management system (Bloom et al., 2015). Thus, when a
ﬁrm’s operations are more standardized, it can help to decrease the diﬃculty in integration during M&As.
Finally, the services help target ﬁrms recruit talent. High-quality talent guarantees a ﬁrm’s overall quality,
especially for start-ups. High-quality talent with rich experience plays a key role in the success of technology
commercialization (Dertouzos et al., 1988). Hellmann and Puri (2002) ﬁnd that VC/PEs use their own net-
works to help target ﬁrms recruit senior management. Bottazzi et al. (2008) also ﬁnd that the more experience
venture capitalists have, the more likely they are to help start-ups recruit managers and directors. The high-
quality talents become a valuable asset if they decide to stay with the acquirers after M&As. Therefore, the
value-added services from VC/PEs exert a positive eﬀect on ﬁrm quality, especially in their improvement of
innovation capability, corporate governance enhancement and talent recruitment.
To summarize, VC/PEs can eﬀectively identify high-quality targets ex ante, and can also further increase
ﬁrm value by providing eﬀective supervision and value-added services ex post (Chemmanur et al., 2011;
Guo and Jiang, 2013). Hence, compared with ﬁrms without VC/PE holdings, those with VC/PE shares can
ensure that they themselves are more premium targets and therefore send the signal that they are high quality
in the M&A market. Based on this, we develop the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. VC/PEs are a signal that target ﬁrms are high quality, and the stock market reacts positively to
M&A transactions with VC/PE-backed target ﬁrms.
Reputation is a valuable intangible asset gradually accumulated through ﬁrms’ past experience and satis-
factory performance, and it is an important mechanism to alleviate information asymmetry (Hsu, 2004). In the
absence of credible and suﬃcient ﬁrm information, outsiders rely more on the ‘‘certiﬁcation” of ﬁrms fromPlease cite this article in press as: Tang, Q., Li, W. Identifying M&A targets and the information content of VC/PEs. China Journal of
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credibility of the ‘‘certiﬁcation”. As they are in an industry with many competitors and relatively scattered
markets, most VC/PEs adopt a diﬀerentiation strategy that focuses on specialized market segments. In these
market segments, information asymmetry still exists between the ﬁrms and VC/PEs. Thus, the role of reputa-
tion is particularly important (Shu et al., 2011). A good reputation is a fundamental element in gaining a com-
petitive advantage for VC/PEs. VC/PEs with a better reputation not only enter target ﬁrms at a lower cost
(Hsu, 2004), but also are more favored by well-qualiﬁed targets. Furthermore, having a better reputation also
means that the VC/PEs are more likely to select better target ﬁrms. As those VC/PEs with a better reputation
tend to have broader networks and more professional management teams, they can more quickly help ﬁrms to
grow and improve their quality upon entry. The eﬀect of VC/PE reputation on ﬁrm performance is supported
by the literature. Nahata (2008) ﬁnds that VC reputation can improve investment returns. The higher the rep-
utation of the VC, the higher the probability of its successful exit, the faster the invested ﬁrms can achieve IPO
and the higher the asset productivity upon IPO. Nahata (2008) further examines the source of the value gen-
erated when VC/PE reputation improves investment returns and ﬁnds that the value comes from both ex ante
eﬀective screening and ex post adequate monitoring experience. Krishnan et al. (2011) also ﬁnd that the better
the reputation of the VC, the more likely it is to select well-qualiﬁed targets. In addition, VCs can provide
high-quality services to promote ﬁrms’ corporate governance and improve post-IPO ﬁrm performance in
the long run. Although outsiders (the acquirers) are less likely to know much about the detailed information
of the ﬁrms in which VC/PEs invest, they are aware that VC/PEs pay attention to managing and enhancing
their reputation, selecting superior targets and providing better value-added services. Therefore, the better the
reputation of the VC/PE, the more prominent its ‘‘certiﬁcation” role and the stronger the signal of the targets
being high quality. Based on this, we propose our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. When VC/PEs have a better reputation, it sends a signal that target ﬁrms are higher quality, and
the market reacts more positively.
Collective rationality behavior refers to the concerted action taken by the majority of the community under
the guidance of ‘‘common faith”. When a target has more participating VC/PEs, it suggests that more diﬀerent
VC/PEs have a ‘‘common belief” in the screening process, and that these VC/PEs are unanimously optimistic
about the targets’ potential market prospects. Hence, such investment behavior is a result of collective
rationality behavior. Pence (1982) points out that VC/PEs usually invite other investors to make assessments
when they ﬁnd a valuable investment target. If other VC/PEs are also willing to invest, the leading VC/PE is
very likely to make the investment decision. Given that diﬀerent VC/PEs make the same investment choices,
their investment behavior is essentially mutually conﬁrmed and recognized (Perez, 1986), which further proves
that they identify high-quality targets. Lerner (1994) argues that in the presence of asymmetric information,
two or more VC/PEs are more eﬀective in gathering information and assessing value than one. As a result, the
quality of the investment projects jointly identiﬁed by multiple VC/PEs is higher. Meanwhile, multiple VC/
PEs can oﬀer more complementary professional knowledge and management experience for investing in target
ﬁrms (Casamatta and Haritchabalet, 2007), are more likely to increase target ﬁrms’ R&D investments (Guo
and Jiang, 2013) and eventually enhance the value of the targets (Brander et al., 2002). This means that based
on collective rationality behavior, the larger the number of VC/PEs a target ﬁrm has, the more likely it is to
deliver the signal that it is high quality. This leads to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. When target ﬁrms have more VC/PEs, it sends a signal that they are higher quality, and the
market reacts more positively.3. Research design
3.1. Sample selection and data sources
We ﬁrst sort out the initial sample of VC/PEs exiting through M&As from the ‘‘China PEVC database” in
the Wind database. Based on this sample, we then use the ‘‘Chinese M&A database” to ﬁnd M&A events
started by A-share listed ﬁrms and match them with the initial sample of VC/PEs exiting through M&As.Please cite this article in press as: Tang, Q., Li, W. Identifying M&A targets and the information content of VC/PEs. China Journal of
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mation disclosure Website designated by the China Securities Regulatory Commission, we obtain 135 M&A
events with VC/PEs involved in target ﬁrms. Due to the special characteristics of the ﬁnancial industry and the
treatment from the prior literature, we exclude acquirers and targets from the ﬁnancial industry. We lose ﬁve
observations when calculating the CARs. Finally, we have 130 observations (M&A events) with M&A sellers
backed by VC/PEs. It should be noted that these M&A events mainly occurred during 2013–2014. To test our
hypotheses, we create a control sample group by selecting M&A events in which ownership was transferred
and the transactions were completed during 2013–2014 from the Wind M&A database. At the same time,
we collect the ﬁnancial data of target ﬁrms from the M&A announcements of CNINF, and exclude observa-
tions with missing ﬁnancial data for the target ﬁrms. We obtain our ﬁnancial data for the acquirers from the
China Stock Market & Accounting Research database. Finally, we obtain 384 observations for the control
sample group. Therefore, our total regression sample contains 514 observations. To mitigate the eﬀect of out-
liers, we winsorize continuous variables at the 1% level in both tails.3.2. Model specification and variable definitions
3.2.1. Model specification
Following McNichols and Stubben (2015) and Liu et al. (2015), we use regression models (1) and (2) to test
whether VC/PEs have information content and the diﬀerence in information content resulting from the
heterogeneity of the VC/PEs during M&As. We include industry and year dummies to control for the eﬀects
of industries and years in all of the regressions. In addition, we report t-values based on robust standard errors
clustered by individual ﬁrms.Please
AccouCAR ¼ aþ b1  VC=PE þ d Controlþ n ð1Þ
CAR ¼ aþ b1  Re putation=Syndicateþ d Controlþ n ð2Þ3.2.2. Variable definitions
CARs are the cumulative abnormal returns at the M&A event date. We use the market model (Brown and
Warner, 1985) to calculate CARs, that is, Ri;t ¼ ai þ bi  Rm;t þ n. Ri;t is the daily yield of stock i for period t
including cash dividend reinvestment and Rm;t is the daily rate of return of market m for period t including cash
dividend reinvestment. Following Tian et al. (2013), we use the period between 180 and 30 trading days before
the M&A announcement date as the estimation period to calculate ɑ and b for each transaction in the sample.
We then calculate the expected return values from 30 trading days before to 30 trading days after the
announcement date based on the preceding model, and use the actual values minus the expected values to cal-
culate the abnormal returns from 30 trading days before to 30 trading days after the M&A announcement
date. Finally, we use the estimated parameters to calculate CARs over the three-day (1,+1) event window
centered on the M&A announcement date (Huang et al., 2014).
Following Huang et al. (2014) and Liu et al. (2015), we control for other variables that aﬀect CARs, includ-
ing the natural logarithm of the book value of acquirers’ total assets in year t1 (Sizet1); ﬁrm’s return on net
assets in year t1 (ROAt1); investment opportunities in year t1 (Tobin’s qt1); revenue growth in year t1
(Growtht1); ﬁnancial leverage in year t1 (Riskt1); ﬁrm’s free cash ﬂow in year t1 (Cashﬂowt1); transac-
tion value amount (Expense); ownership concentration (Top and Top2); CEO duality (Dual); and target’s
assets, ROA and age. The deﬁnitions of the main variables are presented in Table 1.4. Empirical results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the main variables. Table 3 lists the diﬀerence in average CARs
between the VC/PE-backed targets and non-VC/PE-backed targets. There is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in stock
market reactions based on whether the M&A activities involve VC/PE-backed targets. Compared with thecite this article in press as: Tang, Q., Li, W. Identifying M&A targets and the information content of VC/PEs. China Journal of
nting Research (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2016.08.002
Table 1
Variable deﬁnitions.
Variable type Variable name Symbol Deﬁnition
Dependent variables Cumulative abnormal return CAR Cumulative abnormal return for the acquirer before and after the
M&A announcement event-day window
Explanatory variables Venture capital/private equity fund VC/PE Dummy variable that equals 1 if there is a VC/PE-backed target and 0
otherwise
Reputation of VC/PE Reputation Age of the lead VC/PEa
Syndicated VC/PE Syndicate Number of VC/PEs in the target
Control variables Firm asset Size Natural logarithm of the book value of the acquirers’ total assets
Firm performance ROA Net income/total assets
Operating income growth rate Growth (Amount of revenue this year –Amount of revenue previous year)/
Amount of revenue previous year
Investment opportunities of ﬁrm Tobin’s q Market value of total assets/book value of total assets
Financial leverage Risk (Net proﬁt + Income tax Expense + Finance charge)/(Net proﬁt + Income tax expense)
Free cash ﬂow Cashﬂow (Net proﬁt + Interest expense + Non cash expense–Working capital
supplement–Capital expenditure)/Total assets at the beginning of the year
Transaction value Expense Natural logarithm of the value of M&A transactions
Related M&A Relative Dummy variable that equals 1 if there is a related M&A and 0 otherwise
Target asset Target_asset Natural logarithm of the book value of the target’s total assets
Target age Target_age Natural logarithm of (1 + Target age)
Target performance Target_roa Net proﬁt divided by total assets
Ownership concentration Top Proportion of the ﬁrst largest shareholder
Square of ownership concentration Top2 Square of the proportion of the ﬁrst largest shareholder
CEO duality Dual Firm’s CEO duality, equal to 1 if the CEO also holds the position of
board chair and 0 otherwise
a Lerner (1994), Gompers (1996) and Gompers and Lerner (1999) use the ﬁrm’s age as a proxy for its reputation.
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Variables Obs. Mean Median Stdev Min Max
CAR[1,1] 514 0.060 0.030 0.100 0.150 0.270
VC/PE 514 0.250 0 0.440 0 1
Size 514 21.66 21.57 1.060 19.57 24.91
Risk 514 1.190 1.020 0.880 2.680 5.240
ROA 514 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.100 0.200
Tobin’s q 514 2.270 1.820 1.730 0.170 9.350
Growth 514 0.250 0.150 0.580 0.520 4.650
Cashﬂow 514 0.010 0.020 0.090 0.300 0.260
Dual 514 0.310 0 0.460 0 1
Top 514 0.343 0.318 0.147 0.106 0.708
Top2 514 0.140 0.100 0.110 0.010 0.500
Relative 514 0.350 0 0.480 0 1
Expense 514 19.14 19.27 1.510 16.12 22.43
Target_roa 514 0.080 0.060 0.180 0.630 0.640
Target_asset 514 18.93 18.95 1.510 14.43 22.59
Target_age 514 2.090 2.200 0.740 0 3.500
Table 3
Univariate tests of acquirers’ CARs distinguished by VC backing status.
Variables Obs. CAR[1,1]
VC/PE-backed targets 130 0.117
Non-VC/PE-backed targets 384 0.040
Combined 514 0.053
Diﬀ 0.077***
8 Q. Tang, W. Li /China Journal of Accounting Research xxx (2016) xxx–xxxscenario where the targets are not backed by VC/PEs, the stock market has a positive reaction to the M&A
transactions in which the targets are backed by VC/PEs, and the acquirers receive higher CARs, providing
preliminary support for Hypothesis 1.
4.2. Multivariate regression analysis
4.2.1. Results of Hypothesis 1
Table 4 reports the regression results of Hypothesis 1. Column (1) presents the regression result based on
the sample excluding VC/PEs. The estimated coeﬃcients of Target_roa and Target_asset are both insigniﬁ-
cant, suggesting that the target ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial information does not convey signiﬁcant information content
for acquirers to distinguish the quality of the target ﬁrms. Column (2) includes the regression results with
VC/PEs, not controlling for Target_roa and Target_asset. The results show that the coeﬃcient of VC/PE is
signiﬁcantly positive at the 1% level (t-statistic = 3.05). Column (3) includes VC/PE, Target_roa and Tar-
get_asset, and the coeﬃcient of VC/PE is still signiﬁcantly positive at the 1% level (t-statistic = 3.20). This sug-
gests that VC/PEs contain signiﬁcant information content in the M&A process and send a favorable signal
that the target ﬁrms are high quality. Thus, the market has positive feedback for M&A activities involving
VC/PE-backed target ﬁrms. That is, relative to M&A transactions without VC/PE-backed target ﬁrms, those
with VC/PE-backed targets yield higher CARs for investors. Overall, the results support Hypothesis 1.
Firms invested in by VC/PEs usually possess abundant heterogeneous resources, with high growth and
potential market prospects. These resources function as ‘‘fresh blood” for the acquirers, and they play an
important role in achieving transformation and upgrades for listed ﬁrms. In terms of the control variables,
the size of the transaction is signiﬁcantly positive at the 1% level, implying that the bigger the size of the trans-
action, the stronger the eﬀect it has on the acquirers’ value. As a result, the stock market has a signiﬁcant
positive response. The coeﬃcient of related M&A (Relative) is not signiﬁcant, indicating an insigniﬁcant
diﬀerence in the eﬀect on acquirers’ value depending on whether the acquisitions are related. Firm size isPlease cite this article in press as: Tang, Q., Li, W. Identifying M&A targets and the information content of VC/PEs. China Journal of
Accounting Research (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2016.08.002
Q. Tang, W. Li / China Journal of Accounting Research xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 9signiﬁcantly negative at the 1% level in all of the regressions, consistent with studies by Huang et al. (2014) and
Liu et al. (2015).4.2.2. Further analysis of Hypothesis 1
Table 4 shows that the stock market responds positively to M&A transactions in which acquirers acquire
VC/PE-backed targets. What is the mechanism underlying the eﬀect of VC/PEs on the stock market? If VC/
PEs play the role of an information mechanism in the M&A process, then we should observe that the more
diﬃcult it is for acquirers to obtain information to identify high-quality targets, the more signiﬁcant VC/PEs’
‘‘certiﬁcation” role is. To further verify that the information transmitted by VC/PEs during M&A serves asTable 4
Hypothesis 1 results.
Variable (1) Full sample (2) Full sample (3) Full sample
CAR[1,1] CAR[1,1] CAR[1,1]
Constant 0.116 0.126 0.148
(1.07) (1.18) (1.39)
VC/PE 0.037*** 0.038***
(3.05) (3.20)
Size 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.034***
(7.83) (8.09) (7.39)
Risk 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.53) (0.36) (0.34)
ROA 0.141 0.144 0.133
(1.35) (1.42) (1.30)
Growth 0.003 0.002 0.004
(0.41) (0.33) (0.57)
Tobin’s q 0.008** 0.008*** 0.008***
(2.45) (2.64) (2.60)
Cashﬂow 0.027 0.027 0.0200
(0.62) (0.63) (0.45)
Dual 0.012 0.009 0.011
(1.37) (1.09) (1.22)
Top 0.161 0.189 0.193
(1.35) (1.60) (1.64)
Top2 0.272* 0.317** 0.326**
(1.81) (2.13) (2.20)
Relative 0.012 0.011 0.013
(1.30) (1.20) (1.43)
Expense 0.027*** 0.022*** 0.022**
(6.55) (6.80) (4.74)
Target_roa 0.028 0.038
(1.08) (1.58)
Target_asset 0.003 0.002
(0.68) (0.54)
Target_age 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.18) (0.19) (0.07)
Year YES YES YES
Industry YES YES YES
N 514 514 514
Adj. R2 0.311 0.327 0.329
Notes:
(1) ***, ** and * represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
(2) t-values are reported in parentheses.
Please cite this article in press as: Tang, Q., Li, W. Identifying M&A targets and the information content of VC/PEs. China Journal of
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10 Q. Tang, W. Li /China Journal of Accounting Research xxx (2016) xxx–xxx‘‘certiﬁcation”, we choose two speciﬁc aspects to examine the question: the acquirers’ M&A experience and the
information environment of the target ﬁrms. First, we look at the acquirers’ M&A experience. Organizational
learning theory holds that experiential learning is a process of organizations acquiring, understanding, spread-
ing, developing and using their experience (Huber, 1991). Sophisticated M&A experience can enable ﬁrms to
continuously improve their M&A management process and apply the improved M&A knowledge to future
strategic decisions (Guo et al., 2011). Such a process can eﬀectively enhance the ability of ﬁrms to identify
M&A targets and lead to better M&A performance (Fowler and Schmidt, 1989). When the acquirers lack
M&A experience, it is more diﬃcult to identify high-quality targets. At this time, if VC/PEs can transfer infor-
mation, their ‘‘certiﬁcation” role should be strengthened. Second, we investigate the information environment
in which the targets are located. From the perspective of information dissemination, when a region has a
higher degree of marketization, the information ﬂow mechanism is smoother and communication costs are
lower. This also makes it more eﬃcient for outsiders to obtain business information (Yu et al., 2012) and
encourages more standardized information disclosure. On the contrary, in areas with lower levels of marke-
tization, it is more diﬃcult and costly for outsiders to obtain information. Therefore, the worse the informa-
tion environment is for target ﬁrms, the more diﬃcult it is for acquirers to obtain eﬀective information and
identify high-quality targets. In this case, VC/PEs should be able to play a more signiﬁcant ‘‘certiﬁcation” role.
Accordingly, depending on the M&A experience of the acquirers, we divide the M&A sample into experi-
enced and inexperienced groups.1 We measure the information environment based on the government inter-
vention index in the areas where target ﬁrms are located (Yu et al., 2012).2 Using the level of government
intervention, we sort the sample into two groups: targets with a better information environment for the targets
and targets with a worse information environment. Table 5 lists the results. Columns (1) and (2) report the
regression results of the groups sorted by M&A experience. The coeﬃcient of VC/PE is signiﬁcantly positive
at the 1% level in the inexperienced group and insigniﬁcant in the experienced group, indicating that it is more
diﬃcult for acquirers to identify high-quality targets when they lack M&A experience and supporting the
notion that VC/PEs provide stronger ‘‘certiﬁcation”. Columns (3) and (4) report the group results based
on information environment. The coeﬃcient of VC/PE is signiﬁcantly positive at the 1% level in the bad infor-
mation environment group and insigniﬁcant in the good information environment group. This means that
VC/PEs play a more important role in the M&A process when acquirers are faced with a worse information
environment. Thus, the results of Table 5 further support Hypothesis 1.
4.2.3. Results of Hypotheses 2 and 3
Table 6 presents the results of Hypotheses 2 and 3. Columns (1) and (2) report the regression results includ-
ing VC/PE reputation. Column (2) includes the target ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial information, Target_roa and Target_as-
set. The results show that the coeﬃcient of Reputation is signiﬁcantly positive at the 5% level, suggesting that
the better the VC/PE reputation, the more prominent its ‘‘certiﬁcation” and consequently the stronger the
stock market’s reaction. This supports Hypothesis 2. Columns (3) and (4) report the results related to the num-
ber of VC/PEs. The coeﬃcient of the number of VC/PEs is signiﬁcantly positive at the 10% level. That is, the
more VC/PEs there are, the stronger the ‘‘certiﬁcation” is, supporting Hypothesis 3. For the same target, ﬁrm
evaluation is more accurate when there are two or more VC/PEs involved compared with one single VC/PE.
As a result, the target ﬁrm conveys a signal of having higher quality when it receives more recognition from
multiple VC/PEs, and the acquirer obtains higher CARs when conducting M&A transactions.
5. Robustness checks
We also conduct the following robustness tests to further strengthen our results.1 Acquisition experience is a proxy for the number of successful acquisitions. The higher the number of acquisitions, the more abundant
the accumulated experience.
2 The higher the amount of government intervention, the lower the degree of marketization, the higher the cost of obtaining a ﬁrm’s
information and the more diﬃcult it is for the acquirer to obtain the target information.
Please cite this article in press as: Tang, Q., Li, W. Identifying M&A targets and the information content of VC/PEs. China Journal of
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Table 5
Cross-sectional analyses of diﬀerent groups.
Variables (1) Lack M&A
experience
(2) Rich M&A
experience
(3) Bad information
environment
(4) Good information
environment
CAR[1,1] CAR[1,1] CAR[1,1] CAR[1,1]
Constant 0.157 0.546*** 0.268* 0.282*
(1.06) (2.69) (1.66) (1.82)
VC/PE 0.040*** 0.028 0.058*** 0.024
(3.10) (1.09) (3.37) (1.50)
Size 0.034*** 0.026*** 0.043*** 0.029***
(5.88) (3.13) (7.06) (4.37)
Risk 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.006
(0.45) (0.49) (1.11) (0.88)
ROA 0.129 0.097 0.092 0.189
(1.03) (0.58) (0.70) (1.16)
Growth 0.005 0.012 0.005 0.007
(0.63) (1.25) (0.05) (1.13)
Tobin’s q 0.010*** 0.006 0.012** 0.006
(2.71) (0.92) (2.56) (1.35)
Cashﬂow 0.013 0.110 0.007 0.030
(0.25) (1.36) (0.09) (0.58)
Dual 0.013 0.011 0.013 0.013
(1.34) (0.59) (1.08) (1.18)
Top 0.232* 0.246 0.233 0.144
(1.76) (0.87) (1.35) (0.86)
Top2 0.425** 0.276 0.366* 0.242
(2.51) (0.77) (1.72) (1.12)
Relative 0.023** 0.002 0.011 0.045***
(2.17) (0.14) (0.93) (3.41)
Expense 0.023*** 0.018* 0.017*** 0.022***
(4.52) (1.84) (2.66) (3.73)
Target_roa 0.065** 0.002 0.013 0.086**
(2.23) (0.03) (0.40) (2.53)
Target_asset 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.008
(0.89) (0.08) (1.00) (1.43)
Target_age 0.007 0.009 0.002 0.003
(1.16) (0.84) (0.28) (0.34)
Year YES YES YES YES
Industry YES YES YES YES
N 337 177 261 253
Adj. R2 0.425 0.122 0.366 0.360
Notes:
(1) ***, ** and * represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(2) t-values are reported in parentheses.
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As using an unbalanced sample may cause certain deviations in the regression results, we use the propensity
score matching (PSM) method to match and construct a balanced sample for the regressions. Based on the
characteristics of the target ﬁrms (e.g., Target_asset, Target_roa and Target_age), we use the near matching
method to conduct one-to-one matches and create the control sample. This way, we ﬁnd 120 observations
in the control group (VC/PE = 0) based on the 120 observations in the treatment group (VC/PE = 1); thus,
the total sample size is 240. We re-run the regression for Hypothesis 1, and the regression results are shown in
Table 7. Although their signiﬁcance level slightly decreases, the coeﬃcients remain signiﬁcant, indicating that
our results are consistent.Please cite this article in press as: Tang, Q., Li, W. Identifying M&A targets and the information content of VC/PEs. China Journal of
Accounting Research (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2016.08.002
Table 6
Results of Hypotheses 2 and 3.
Variables (1) VC/PE = 1 (2) VC/PE = 1 (3) VC/PE = 1 (4) VC/PE = 1
CAR[1,1] CAR[1,1] CAR[1,1] CAR[1,1]
Constant 0.767*** 0.665*** 0.710*** 0.631**
(3.57) (2.67) (3.24) (2.49)
Reputation 0.028** 0.027**
(2.10) (2.07)
Syndicate 0.009* 0.009*
(1.85) (1.66)
Size 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.041*** 0.042***
(4.64) (4.86) (3.82) (4.10)
Risk 0.022* 0.021 0.021* 0.021
(1.67) (1.51) (1.68) (1.53)
ROA 0.202 0.204 0.117 0.124
(0.80) (0.81) (0.48) (0.50)
Tobin’s q 0.011** 0.010** 0.010** 0.009*
(2.14) (1.99) (1.99) (1.78)
Growth 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.036*** 0.036***
(3.83) (3.87) (3.95) (3.94)
Expense 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.009
(0.15) (0.33) (0.16) (0.53)
Cashﬂow 0.042 0.032 0.062 0.051
(0.50) (0.37) (0.78) (0.61)
Target_roa 0.018 0.040
(0.26) (0.56)
Target_asset 0.013 0.012
(1.03) (0.86)
Relative 0.034 0.031 0.045 0.042
(1.16) (1.09) (1.57) (1.46)
Target_age 0.036** 0.030* 0.046*** 0.039**
(2.20) (1.74) (2.66) (2.17)
Dual 0.022 0.022 0.011 0.013
(1.02) (0.98) (0.55) (0.60)
Top 0.374 0.477 0.279 0.387
(1.12) (1.35) (0.82) (1.09)
Top2 0.588 0.734 0.481 0.639
(1.22) (1.43) (0.98) (1.24)
Year YES YES YES YES
Industry YES YES YES YES
N 117 117 117 117
Adj. R2 0.384 0.378 0.375 0.368
Notes:
(1) ***, ** and * represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(2) t-values are reported in parentheses.
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To mitigate the self-selection problem, we use the Heckman two-step method (Heckman, 1979) to adjust for
self-selection. As ﬁrms with technological innovation are more likely to become the investment targets of VC/
PEs and Guangdong, Beijing, Shanghai and Zhejiang are areas with more VC/PEs, and we create variables
based on whether the target ﬁrms have technological innovation and whether they are located in Guangdong,
Beijing, Shanghai or Zhejiang. The ﬁrst-step regression results show that whether the target ﬁrms are techno-
logically innovative and whether they are located in the preceding provinces have strong explanatory power
toward the likelihood of targets having VC/PEs (not reported). We then include the inverse Mills ratio
obtained from the ﬁrst step in regression model 1. Table 8 lists that the inverse Mills ratio is signiﬁcantly neg-
ative and that the VC/PE coeﬃcients remain signiﬁcantly positive, which again supports the validity of our
results.Please cite this article in press as: Tang, Q., Li, W. Identifying M&A targets and the information content of VC/PEs. China Journal of
Accounting Research (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2016.08.002
Table 7
Results of Hypothesis 1 (PSM).
Variables (1) Full sample (2) Full sample (3) Full sample
CAR[1,1] CAR[1,1] CAR[1,1]
Constant 0.295** 0.312** 0.310**
(2.06) (2.22) (2.17)
VC/PE 0.028* 0.028*
(1.83) (1.78)
Size 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.041***
(7.19) (7.38) (6.78)
Risk 0.008 0.007 0.007
(0.90) (0.86) (0.83)
ROA 0.117 0.133 0.128
(0.71) (0.83) (0.78)
Growth 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.017***
(2.66) (2.75) (2.84)
Tobin’s q 0.009** 0.010** 0.010**
(2.41) (2.54) (2.48)
Cashﬂow 0.057 0.055 0.049
(0.87) (0.87) (0.76)
Dual 0.027* 0.024* 0.025*
(1.93) (1.85) (1.82)
Top 0.146 0.179 0.174
(0.74) (0.91) (0.89)
Top2 0.260 0.315 0.309
(1.01) (1.21) (1.20)
Relative 0.016 0.018 0.019
(1.18) (1.29) (1.35)
Expense 0.026*** 0.020*** 0.020**
(3.55) (3.43) (2.29)
Target_roa 0.012 0.026
(0.20) (0.46)
Target_asset 0.004 0.001
(0.40) (0.06)
Target_age 0.005 0.006 0.006
(0.60) (0.63) (0.68)
Year YES YES YES
Industry YES YES YES
N 240 240 240
Adj. R2 0.315 0.329 0.324
Notes:
(1) ***, ** and * represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
(2) t-values are reported in parentheses.
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According to the literature, the commonly used window periods also include [1, 0] and [1, 2], and the
estimated period also includes [150, 30]. Therefore, we use these new window periods and estimated period
to calculate new price reactions and re-run the regressions. The main results remain unchanged (not reported).
5.4. Controlling for other corporate governance variables
We include executive compensation and board size to test Hypotheses 1–3, and the results of the main
explanatory variables remain the same (not reported).Please cite this article in press as: Tang, Q., Li, W. Identifying M&A targets and the information content of VC/PEs. China Journal of
Accounting Research (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2016.08.002
Table 8
Results of Hypothesis 1 (Heckman two-step).
Variables (1) Full sample (2) Full sample
CAR[1,1] CAR[1,1]
Constant 0.160 0.169
(1.49) (1.57)
VC/PE 0.027** 0.029**
(2.35) (2.50)
Size 0.033*** 0.032***
(7.45) (7.05)
Risk 0.001 0.001
(0.26) (0.25)
ROA 0.147 0.140
(1.44) (1.36)
Growth 0.004 0.005
(0.58) (0.72)
Tobin’s q 0.008** 0.008**
(2.42) (2.38)
Cashﬂow 0.026 0.022
(0.62) (0.51)
Dual 0.010 0.011
(1.23) (1.31)
Top 0.185 0.189
(1.58) (1.61)
Top2 0.312** 0.320**
(2.12) (2.17)
Relative 0.011 0.013
(1.30) (1.42)
Expense 0.022*** 0.021***
(6.76) (4.52)
Target_roa 0.026
(1.09)
Target_asset 0.001
(0.09)
Target_age 0.001 0.001
(0.25) (0.22)
Inverse Mills ratio 0.051*** 0.048***
(3.78) (3.37)
Year YES YES
Industry YES YES
N 514 514
Adj. R2 0.343 0.342
Notes:
(1) ***, ** and * represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
(2) t-values are reported in parentheses.
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In theory, if VC/PEs convey the signal that target ﬁrms are high quality, then the sellers in M&A transac-
tions should have more negotiating power over pricing and may in turn ask for higher M&A prices. A large
number of studies have shown that a high M&A price is often an important reason for the failure of an M&A,
causing the acquirers to encounter a ‘‘winner’s curse” situation. In this case, the market may respond nega-
tively to such M&A activities (Gompers and Xuan, 2012). However, our empirical results show that the
CAR is signiﬁcantly positive. Therefore, the acquirers do not fall into the ‘‘winner’s curse” situation, which
means that the acquirers do not pay an excessive premium. To verify this inference, we use the M&A premium
regression model following Huang et al. (2014). Table 9 lists the results. Column (1) contains the resultsPlease cite this article in press as: Tang, Q., Li, W. Identifying M&A targets and the information content of VC/PEs. China Journal of
Accounting Research (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2016.08.002
Q. Tang, W. Li / China Journal of Accounting Research xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 15without controlling for year and industry, and Column (2) controls for year and industry. Column (3) controls
for the corporate governance variables. The results show that regardless of whether we control for the indus-
try, year or corporate governance variables, the VC/PE coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly negative, suggesting that
acquirers do not need to pay a higher premium when acquiring VC/PE-backed targets; in fact, they actually
pay a lower M&A premium. The results indicate that acquirers who acquire VC/PE-backed targets do not
encounter a ‘‘winner’s curse” situation. In terms of control variables, the acquirers’ characteristics and corpo-
rate governance have little inﬂuence on M&A premiums, which is consistent with the ﬁndings by Huang et al.
(2014). However, the characteristics of target ﬁrms have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on M&A premiums. In addition,
the scale of M&A transactions has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on M&A premiums.Table 9
Results of M&A premiums.a
Variables (1) Full sample (2) Full sample (3) Full sample
Premium Premium Premium
Constant 3.014 2.328 6.541*
(1.25) (0.98) (1.95)
VC/PE 0.487** 0.483* 0.571**
(2.12) (1.88) (2.26)
Size 0.052 0.014 0.032
(0.53) (0.14) (0.27)
ROA 1.242 1.950 2.279
(0.60) (0.92) (1.00)
Tobin’s q 0.033 0.012 0.003
(0.44) (0.16) (0.04)
Growth 0.028 0.019 0.028
(0.19) (0.11) (0.17)
Cashﬂow 0.627 0.881 1.035
(0.83) (1.04) (1.22)
Target_age 0.090 0.104 0.098
(0.76) (0.85) (0.80)
Target_roa 2.017*** 1.939*** 1.838**
(2.93) (2.75) (2.40)
Target_asset 1.274*** 1.292*** 1.265***
(10.65) (9.98) (9.67)
Expense 1.510*** 1.530*** 1.529***
(11.86) (11.37) (11.27)
Dual 0.113
(0.57)
Top 0.039
(1.43)
Top2 5.755
(1.65)
Dir_num 0.068
(1.05)
Pay 0.264
(1.38)
Year NO YES YES
Industry NO YES YES
N 435 435 435
Adj. R2 0.442 0.454 0.457
Notes:
(1) ***, ** and * represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
(2) t-values are reported in parentheses.
a Excluding negative net assets and missing data, the regression sample
decreases to 435 ﬁrms.
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We oﬀer two possible explanations. First, from the information perspective, VC/PEs may communicate more
with acquirers in the M&A process, thus decreasing the degree of information asymmetry on the acquirers’
side and making the M&A transaction process more eﬀective. As a result, the acquirers do not pay a higher
premium. Second, VC/PEs face the pressure of liquidity in China. Based on the reality of China’s VC/PE
investments, the almost feverish stock market before 2007 attracted a large number of VC/PEs to invest in
non-listed ﬁrms, which helped the VC/PEs to obtain high returns through IPOs. However, after 2007, China’s
stock market experienced a long bear market. Furthermore, IPO approvals and listings were shutdown during
2012 and 2013. These events led to inventory accumulation for many VC/PEs.3 Faced with severe pressure
from liquidity, VC/PEs can only change their exiting channel to exit M&As.
Therefore, VC/PEs convey the signal that a target is high quality, and eﬀective communication with acquir-
ers decreases the information asymmetry in target pricing. In addition, VC/PEs face liquidity pressure, causing
target ﬁrms to make concessions in price negotiations.4 This suggests that acquiring VC/PE-backed targets is a
‘‘cheap but ﬁne” transaction. As a result, acquirers not only obtain high-quality targets, but also beneﬁt from
not paying excessively high premiums.
7. Conclusions and implications
Due to the information gap faced by many acquirers in the M&A process, identifying high-quality target
ﬁrms has become a crucial step in M&A transactions for ﬁrms to generate value. In this study, we examine the
characteristics of M&A sellers and ﬁnd that VC/PEs have signiﬁcant information content in the M&A market.
Our speciﬁc ﬁndings are detailed as follows.
First, VC/PEs have a very signiﬁcant ‘‘certiﬁcation” role during M&As. Based on the short-term reactions
of the stock market, investors respond positively when bidders acquire VC/PE-backed targets. Second, when
acquirers lack M&A experience and targets are located in inferior information environments, bidders face a
greater information gap, and the ‘‘certiﬁcation” role of VC/PEs becomes more prominent. Third, there is a
signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the information content due to the heterogeneity of VC/PE features. The higher the
reputation of the VC/PE and the more involved it is in the target ﬁrm, the stronger its information content.
Finally, acquirers do not pay premiums when acquiring high-quality targets, suggesting that the acquisition of
VC/PE-backed targets is a ‘‘cheap but ﬁne” transaction.
Our study has three practical implications. First, through VC/PEs’ signaling, acquirers can select high-
quality targets in the M&A market. At present, China’s many ﬁrms are facing the dilemmas of transformation
and upgrading. Their main problem lies in the lack of core competitiveness gained from heterogeneous
resources. M&As, as an important way to achieve rapid transformation and upgrading, have been accepted
and favored by an increasing amount of ﬁrms. However, determining how to identify high-quality targets
has been an ongoing struggle for acquirers. According to our ﬁndings, it is a wise investment to acquire
VC/PE-backed targets. As acquirers face a serious information gap when searching for target ﬁrms with
potentially high growth (e.g., technological innovation ﬁrms), it is diﬃcult for them to evaluate the future mar-
ket value of targets. Relying on ‘‘certiﬁcation” from VC/PEs, acquirers can more easily screen out high-quality
targets from the large pool of potential target ﬁrms.
Second, investors can obtain higher returns from investments by purchasing the stocks of ﬁrms that acquire
VC/PE-backed targets. Based on our ﬁndings, bidders who acquire targets with VC/PE holdings can receive
higher abnormal returns from the market. Therefore, investors who buy the stocks of such ﬁrms can make
more investment proﬁts in the stock market. In addition, market reactions diﬀer depending on the heterogene-
ity of the VC/PE characteristics, which also help investors to better identify and discover the value of stocks
after M&As.3 China’s ﬁrst investment research report shows that since 2000 PEs have invested in more than 9000 projects and failed to exit from
more than 7500 projects. Those who did not withdraw from projects invested a total of more than 600 billion yuan.
4 Chongqing Business Newspaper provides a realistic annotation titled ‘‘How VC/PE see proﬁt is almost equal to the ‘ﬂesh’ as the IPO
blocked”. According to statistics, the total transaction amount was $355 million in 2012 with 140 cases of M&An exit. The average book
return is only 1.1 times, which means that the M&A transaction price for VC/PEs is very low.
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gain heterogeneous resources externally and quickly improve the core competitiveness of ﬁrms, but also devel-
ops VC/PEs. VC/PEs search for valuable start-ups on the entrepreneurial market in which to invest so they
can gain reasonable returns through M&A exits. Meanwhile, large ﬁrms acquire these high-quality targets
through the M&A market to achieve rapid development. As a result, a benign ‘‘ecosystem” is formed from
the interaction between mature ﬁrms, VC/PEs and start-ups.
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